Certainty of term: letting 'until the land is needed' to a company (Berrisford v Mexfield)

A lease must be for a term whose maximum duration is certain from the outset. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 AC 386, as explained by the Supreme Court in Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd [2011] UKSC 52, a letting 'until the land is required' by the landlord for road widening was held incapable of creating a tenancy for that term, because it was of uncertain, potentially perpetual, duration. Kestrel's agreement is of the same kind. However, Kestrel took exclusive possession and has paid rent periodically, so a periodic tenancy arises by reference to the rent period. In Berrisford the Supreme Court held that an individual could instead take a 90-year term under s.149(6) LPA 1925, because the common law would have treated the arrangement as a tenancy for life; but the Court noted that this route is available only to an individual, not a corporate tenant such as Kestrel.

Why A is wrong: Clarity about the terminating event is not enough; the maximum duration must be certain at the outset.

Why B is wrong: The 90-year conversion under s.149(6) applies only where the tenant is an individual, not a company.

Why C is wrong: A periodic tenancy arises from exclusive possession and periodic rent; a fixed end date is not needed for a periodic tenancy.

Why E is wrong: A tenancy for life can be held only by an individual; a company cannot hold a lease for life.