Secondary victims after Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
In March, Dr Okafor negligently failed to diagnose Daniel's serious heart disease when Daniel attended his GP surgery with chest pain. Eight months later, Daniel suffered a cardiac arrest at home and collapsed in front of his wife, Mei, who watched paramedics try and fail to resuscitate him. Mei has since been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. It is accepted that Daniel would have survived with proper treatment, that Mei and Daniel had a close and loving marriage, and that a person of reasonable fortitude in Mei's position might have suffered a psychiatric illness.
Which of the following best describes whether Mei can recover damages as a secondary victim?
Choose one answer to see the reasoning.
Worked answer
Correct answer C: No, because a secondary victim can recover only where she witnesses an accident or its immediate aftermath, and a death from an untreated disease is not an accident.
THE RULE TO REMEMBER
After Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, a secondary victim must witness an accident or its immediate aftermath; witnessing death or injury from negligently untreated disease does not ground a claim.
Secondary victims after Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust
In Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 the majority of the Supreme Court held that the established rules for secondary victims apply to accidents, meaning an unexpected and unintended event which causes injury (or a risk of injury) to a victim by violent external means. Witnessing the death or manifestation of injury from a pre-existing disease which a doctor negligently failed to diagnose and treat is not analogous, and the persons a doctor ought reasonably to have in contemplation do not include close family members who might be psychologically affected by witnessing it. There is therefore no duty of care to Mei, however strongly she satisfies the other Alcock factors.
Why A is wrong: A close tie, presence and direct perception are required, but in Paul they were not enough because Mei did not witness an accident.
Why B is wrong: The majority in Paul rejected any separate requirement that the event witnessed be "horrifying".
Why D is wrong: The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's reading of Novo and saw no reason why the length of time between the negligence and the event witnessed should affect liability; the claim fails for the absence of an accident, not because of the gap in time.
Why E is wrong: The majority held that the law took a wrong turn in requiring proof of a "sudden shock to the nervous system", and in any event there was no accident.
That's today's practice done. Another featured question tomorrow.
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