Extra pay for performing an existing contractual duty: practical benefit (Williams v Roffey)
Brightwell Construction Ltd is main contractor on a school extension in England. It sub-contracted the roofing to Kofi Asante for £40,000. Halfway through, Brightwell's site manager realised Kofi had underpriced the job and might not be able to finish. Brightwell faces a large delay payment under its main contract if the roof is late. On Brightwell's own initiative, its manager promised Kofi an extra £6,000 if he completed the roof on time. Kofi did not threaten to stop work. He completed on time, but Brightwell now refuses to pay the £6,000, saying Kofi only did what he was already bound to do.
Which of the following best describes whether Kofi can recover the £6,000?
Choose one answer to see the reasoning.
Worked answer
Correct answer A: Yes, because Brightwell obtained a practical benefit from its promise, such as avoiding the delay payment, and the promise was not obtained by duress or fraud.
THE RULE TO REMEMBER
A promise of extra payment for performing an existing contractual duty to the promisor is binding if the promisor obtains a practical benefit and the promise was not procured by economic duress or fraud.
Extra pay for performing an existing contractual duty: practical benefit (Williams v Roffey)
In Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd the Court of Appeal held that where A has contracted to do work for B, B has reason to doubt that A will complete, and B promises A extra payment to complete on time, B's promise is binding if B obtains in practice a benefit or avoids a disbenefit, and the promise was not given as a result of A's economic duress or fraud. Glidewell LJ said this refines, but does not overrule, Stilk v Myrick. On these facts Brightwell doubted Kofi's ability to finish, made the promise on its own initiative, and gained practical benefits: avoiding the delay payment under the main contract and the trouble and cost of engaging another roofer. Kofi applied no pressure. Brightwell's promise is therefore supported by consideration, and Kofi can recover the £6,000.
Why B is wrong: Williams v Roffey limits Stilk v Myrick: a practical benefit to the promisor can be consideration where there is no duress or fraud.
Why C is wrong: Kofi does not need estoppel, because the practical benefit to Brightwell is consideration for its promise, so it is enforceable as a contract.
Why D is wrong: There is no general requirement that a variation of a building sub-contract be in writing or by deed; the variation in Williams v Roffey was oral.
Why E is wrong: In Williams v Roffey the sub-contractor did no extra work; the benefit to the promisor was enough.
A little more practice done.
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