Death over three years after the injury: Attorney General's consent (Year and a Day Rule Act 1996)
On 14 January 2023, Gareth Lloyd was attacked with a knife in Swansea and left with a severe brain injury. The attacker could not then be identified. Gareth died from complications of the injury on 2 July 2026. In August 2026 DNA evidence identifies Bethany Rowe as the attacker. The Crown Prosecution Service wishes to charge her with Gareth's murder. She has never been convicted of any offence connected with the attack.
Which of the following best describes the position on bringing a murder prosecution against Bethany?
Choose one answer to see the reasoning.
Worked answer
Correct answer E: Proceedings for murder may be instituted only by or with the consent of the Attorney General.
THE RULE TO REMEMBER
The year and a day rule is abolished; where the fatal injury was sustained more than three years before death, proceedings for murder or manslaughter need the Attorney General's consent.
Death over three years after the injury: Attorney General's consent (Year and a Day Rule Act 1996)
The 'year and a day rule', which conclusively presumed that an act did not cause a death occurring more than a year and a day later, was abolished for all purposes by s.1 of the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Instead, s.2 restricts the institution of proceedings for a 'fatal offence', which includes murder. Under s.2(1) and (2)(a), where the injury alleged to have caused the death was sustained more than three years before the death, proceedings may only be instituted by or with the consent of the Attorney General. Gareth was injured on 14 January 2023 and died on 2 July 2026, more than three years later. So a murder prosecution is possible, but only with the Attorney General's consent. Section 2(4) disapplies any provision requiring the DPP's consent. Causation must still be proved in the usual way.
Why A is wrong: The year and a day rule was abolished for all purposes by s.1 of the 1996 Act.
Why B is wrong: The three-year gap does not bar a prosecution; it only triggers the need for the Attorney General's consent.
Why C is wrong: The 1996 Act requires the Attorney General's consent, and s.2(4) excludes any DPP consent requirement.
Why D is wrong: Because more than three years passed between the injury and the death, s.2 requires the Attorney General's consent.
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